Volume III, Treatise III, Chapter XIII

An Objection Is Answered, and Thereby This Subject 1s More Clearly Elucidated. /

SomE may object, that this exact observance of every little point relating to poverty is too severe, and that, after all, several other religious, who make the same vow of poverty as we do, receive money from their parents and friends without any difficulty, to buy them a breviary, books, or clothes, and yet are looked upon to be well-informed persons and true servants of Almighty God. Nor do they scruple to give a book to one of their fellow-monks, or to any one of their friends or relations, and perhaps even something of greater consequence, without the superior’s leave, nor do they think that they act at all against their vow of poverty in this. Now, if they do not sin, it follows that we do not sin against our vow by disposing of things in like manner. All the fault that can be committed, is, that we do not act herein according to the perfection of poverty, nor show that submission we ought to our superiors, and to the rules and constitutions of our order. This objection is a strong one, and it is selected, in order that the answer to it may elucidate what I have already said, and what I shall hereafter say on this subject. I agree with you, that in some orders, the religious do, and may dispose of some things, as the objection says, without scruple or breach of poverty; but it does not follow from thence, that we can imitate them without committing sin; on the contrary I maintain, that we should hereby not only offend against the obedience we owe our rule, but also violate the vow of poverty. The reason of this difference, is, that these things are now permitted in some orders, either by the express or tacit consent of superiors, which tacit consent exists, divines say, when superiors know of a custom that has been introduced, and though able to prevent it, yet tolerate and connive at it; “for then silence gives consent”. Now, a religious when he has either a tacit or express leave from his superior, does not offend against his vow of poverty by receiving or disposing of anything, and consequently the practice of those religious mentioned in the objection is lawful. But this does not hold in the society, where we endeavour to live up to the perfection and purity of poverty, and where there is no leave either tacit or express given for this practice. On the contrary, our custom is directly opposite to this; and hence one of our society would sin against his vow of poverty, should he so receive or dispose of anything, and the other religious above mentioned would equally offend, were he not protected by the permission. Religious women vow poverty, yet some of them have pensions to buy themselves habits, books, and other conveniencies; nor does any body look upon this as a fault in them, since their superiors permit this practice. Yet if any of the society should do this without leave, he would sin against his vow of poverty; nor can the practice of several learned and pious men in other orders, warrant the same amongst us. Other orders have either a tacit or express leave for it, the society has none; nay, its practice is quite contrary; and therefore the obligations set down in the other chapter are not bare scruples, but solid truths, grounded upon the very nature of poverty and the general consent of divines.

St. Bonaventure and Gerson, both of them very spiritual men and great divines, have left in their books several of these very cases we have set down; and in order to decide whether a religious can give or receive anything, they reduce the whole matter to this one point, viz., his having either an express or tacit leave from his superior. If he has not, they declare that a religious can neither give nor take, nor dispose of anything, without a breach of his vow of poverty; for he ceases to be poor and becomes proprietor, who accepts or disposes of things at pleasure. Gerson puts the case in the person of a procurator of a monastery, who has the money of the community in his hands, and he asks the question, whether this procurator would sin against his vow of poverty by buying a knife, a comb-case, or pair of spectacles either for himself or for another—nay, he descends to things yet more inconsiderable, as a needle or a little thread; and answers, that should he do these things by an express or tacit leave from his superior, there would be no sin, but without this leave he would break his vow of poverty; and the great chancellor of Paris, says the same of a religious, who gives to, or receives from a secular person, without his superior’s permission. Thus you see how all divines agree, that the giving, taking, or disposing of anything without leave, is certainly forbidden all religious by the vow of poverty. But if any order permits a religious to have something in particular, or to receive presents from his friends and dispose of them, it is because in such order there is a tacit or express leave, otherwise the vow of poverty would be broken. Hence it follows (and pray, observe the consequence well), that in order to decide whether or not a religious has in this or that case violated his vow of poverty, we must first know the practice of his order, that we may thereby judge if it gives express or tacit consent on such occasions. For, unless you know this, you shall never be able to judge aright, there being in some orders many things permitted, by connivance and tacit consent, which are not so in others.

Hence it also follows, that though some authors hold that a religious who receives money from a secular person to buy books or anything else of that nature, does not sin, provided he exposes what he buys to the view of the community, and is ready also to give them up when the superior shall think fit, yet one of our society, by doing so, would break his vow of poverty. For those authors suppose that there is a tacit leave, and that the superiors are content with this act of resignation in the religious when called upon. But amongst-us there is no such connivance or tacit leave, but a determination and express practice to the contrary. -\As to our cassock, cloaks, breviaries, or anything else which we are permitted to use, we must have such submission to, and dependance on our superior’s will for them, that we must be ready to part with them when he pleases, otherwise we would act against our vow of poverty, and become proprietors. Nor can we receive money to buy a habit or books, or anything else, though we should expose them to the view of the whole world,

and be disposed to give them up at the superior’s command; for _

the practice in the society being quite contrary, involves a breach of the vow of poverty on the part of any that should do so. And should we take this liberty, and relax ever so little in this point, I do not doubt but that it would be reclaimed against in the congregations, and an immediate stop put to all further abuses in this kind, which would destroy the very foundations of that poverty we profess.

Divines make another observation upon this tacit consent or supposed leave, and tell us that it is not sufficient for a religious, in order to ask, receive, take, or keep anything, to know certainly that his superior, on being applied to, would instantly give him leave to do so, no more than it would be sufficient for him to go abroad or to write a letter upon the same presumption. Together with this, they say, that you must be very well assured that your superior would also be very willing you should accept or dispose of the thing without his leave, and that he would not take it ill though his leave were not asked. This is a true description of this tacit permission or leave, which is now introduced into several orders, and by virtue of which they may freely give or take without any farther permission. But this custom is not yet introduced into the society, where superiors are so far from being glad that their subjects do not apply to them on the like occasions, that they hold nothing more dear than to see the contrary strictly observed, and are never more displeased than at the least liberty or presumption in point of obedience. And for this reason we ought to act quite differently from some other orders in the point of poverty, and in some other particulars; for in this respect they are not at present so strictly bound as we are, though without doubt they were so at first, if we may credit their own histories; and we see some orders at present who live up tothe primitive strictness and severity of their rule.

—_——@¢——

About ReligiousBookshelf.com · A Supernerd Media project